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1 Dualist intuitions
I will outline a physicalist explanation of certain intuitions that are often thought to cast
doubt on physicalism. The intuitions I have in mind are more or less those Chalmers
discusses in [Chalmers 2018]. My explanation will recapitulate ideas from [Schwarz
2018], but here I will present the case more directly, abstracting away from the Bayesian
framework assumed in that paper. I begin by describing the relevant intuitions, since I
want to highlight a few points that Chalmers passes over.
First of all, some physical processes seem to give rise to conscious experience. There is
something it is like to see a red flower, or to burn one’s fingers. Moreover, what it’s like
to see the flower is different from what it’s like to burn one’s fingers: the two processes
seem to be associated with different “phenomenal properties”.
Only a small range of physical processes seem to involve phenomenal properties.
Paradigm examples are certain brain processes related to perception. Most other things
that happen in the brain appear to happen in the dark, without any accompanying
phenomenal properties. The same is true (intuitively) for processes outside the brain:
the digestion of food in our intestines, the recording of a burglary on a security camera,
or the flow of a river down a valley.
A second, more puzzling fact about phenomenal properties is that, to some extent,
they seem to be directly and infallibly revealed to the subject of a relevant perceptual
experience. For example, earlier today I was cycling through the rain. As I recall what
that was like, I am certain that I am not right now having an experience with that
phenomenal character. I may be hallucinating the desk in front of me, I may be a brain
in a vat, but I can conclusively rule out that my present experience has those phenomenal
properties.
A third important feature of the association between phenomenal properties and
physical processes is its apparent contingency. While experiences of seeing red are in
fact associated with these phenomenal properties, it seems that they could have been
associated with other phenomenal properties, or with none at all. This appearance of
∗ Thanks to Andy Clark, Justin d’Ambrosio, Frank Jackson, François Kammerer, Colin Klein, Alexander
Sandgren, and Daniel Stoljar for comments on an earlier version, and to David Chalmers for helpful
discussion.
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contingency gives rise to the anti-physicalist intuitions that are the focus of Chalmers’s
“meta-problem”. For example, since phenomenal properties seem to be independent
of physical properties, an agent could intuitively know all physical facts about colour
perception without knowing what it is like to see red. Even the totality of all physical
facts, it seems, is a priori compatible with the hypothesis that there is nothing it is
like to see red. As a corollary, it is hard to see how physical facts could truly explain
the existence and distribution of phenomenal properties: one could always accept the
physical facts, it seems, and still wonder why the phenomenal side should be one way
rather than another.
That’s how things seem – to me, at least, and I suspect to many others. In short,
perceptual processes (along with a few other things that happen in the brain) seem to
have an irreducible phenomenal aspect that is directly revealed to the relevant subject.
It is this seeming that I want to explain.
Chalmers identifies his target as a class of dispositions to think or assert sentences
like ‘consciousness is irreducible’. I think of my target as causally upstream of these
dispositions. For example, it seems to me that any physical hypothesis about an agent is
compatible with a total absence of phenomenal properties. I am here reporting a seeming
in English, but the report is not identical to the seeming, nor is the seeming a brute
disposition to make the report.
I mention this because I want my explanation to support a particular answer to
the puzzle of consciousness, and I don’t think that puzzle is primarily a puzzle about
linguistic dispositions. I want to explain why certain physical processes appear to have
an independent phenomenal character, not why some people are disposed to think or
utter certain words.
Taking the intuitions I have described at face value leads to dualism. We would have
to accept that some physical processes really are associated with special properties that
aren’t fixed by the physical properties, except by epistemically contingent laws. Like
many others, I worry how such properties fit into a naturalistic picture of the world.
But I also think there is something deeply counter-intuitive about the dualist picture.
Consider a world physically like ours but in which the phenomenology of seeing a red
flower has traded places with that of burning one’s fingers. In that world, people classify
the sensation known to us as a kind of pain as neutral or even pleasant, and a popular
opinion among philosophers is that it has intrinsic representational properties related to
colours and flowers. Such a world seems conceivable. But it is strange – much stranger
than a world in which the laws of physics are different. Intuitively, the phenomenology of
burning one’s fingers somehow involves bad things happening to one’s fingers; something
has gone wrong if that phenomenology is associated with looking at a flower.
My intuitions here pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, the physical facts
seem to radically underdetermine the phenomenal facts: physical information about
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an agent, it seems, can never conclusively rule out any hypothesis about what it’s like
to be that agent. On the other hand, the actual association between phenomenal and
physical/functional properties does not seem arbitrary; unlike the laws of physics, it is
not a brute empirical coincidence.
I will try to explain both of these conflicting intuitions. Since I don’t think the source
of the intuitions is essentially linguistic or conceptual, I don’t think the explanation lies
in special features of our phenomenal concepts or words, as some have suggested. Even a
being without a (public or private) language could be puzzled about consciousness. What
gives rise to the intuitions, I think, is something more elementary. It is the functional
architecture of our perceptual system.
2 From stimulus to belief
It used to be easy. When a sensory stimulus arrived, our ancestors responded with
a fixed pattern of behaviour. Same stimulus again, same behavioural response. That
was some hundred million years ago. Since then, we have grown intermediate neural
layers between sensory input and behavioural output – layers which allow us to store
an internal representation of the world, detached from current sensory input. We can
navigate around an obstacle even if we don’t constantly perceive it. When a sensory
stimulus arrives, our brain updates our internal model of the world and then chooses a
behavioural response which makes sense in light of that model and our goals.
But now a problem arises that our distant ancestors didn’t face. How should our world
model be updated when a sensory stimulus arrives?
There are well-known methods for updating a model in response to new information.
But here the input isn’t information; it’s a (proximate) stimulus: a certain pattern of
activity at our neural periphery. To apply the well-known methods, we need to convert
the stimulus into information.
It would help if every possible stimulus could only be caused in one relevant way – for
example, if a certain pattern of photoreceptor activity could only be caused by a snake.
Evolution could then have selected for systems whose internal world model represents
the presence of a snake whenever that stimulus arrives. In fact, however, the correlation
between receptor activity and relevant external (or internal) circumstances is far from
perfect. An oddly shaped stick in the grass may produce the same receptor activity as a
snake. A red surface under white light can cause the same activity as a white surface
under red light. Conversely, due to microscopic “noise”, one and the same state of the
macroscopic environment can lead to different patterns of receptor activity.
So suppose a stimulus S arrives that could have been caused by a variety of environ-
mental conditions E1, E2, E3, . . .. How should a cognitive system update its world model,
if the goal is to reliably achieve an accurate representation?
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In philosophy, some have argued (in effect) that the system’s world model should be
sensitive not just to the proximal stimulus, but also to the distal causes of the stimulus:
if S was caused by E1, the system should represent E1; if S was caused by E2, the
system should represent E2. One problem with this proposal is that if E1 and E2 call for
sufficiently different behavioural reactions, then such a system is physically impossible.
Besides, the proposal has highly implausible consequences. Suppose an organism has
placed a snake-like stick in a certain patch of grass, but worries that the stick has been
removed, and so comes back to check. Before looking at the patch of grass, the organism
is confident that the patch contains either a snake-like stick or nothing snake-like at all.
When it then receives the kind of stimulus (S) that could be caused either by a snake
(E1) or by a snake-like stick (E2), it ought to become confident that the patch contains a
snake-like stick – even if someone in fact took away the stick and a snake happened to
crawl in its place.
In what follows, I will assume without further argument that we need to find a method
that takes a system’s prior world model and a sensory stimulus as input and outputs a
posterior world model, without direct access to what caused the stimulus. What should
that method look like?
A simple but sub-optimal method would select one of the conditions (E1, E2, . . .) that
could have caused the stimulus – the most common one, perhaps – and update the
system’s internal model so that it assigns high probability (say) to that condition. Ideally,
however, the update should take into account earlier information, as in the above example
of the snake and the stick. Depending on the system’s prior world model, the incoming
stimulus S should sometimes be taken to carry information E1, sometimes E2, sometimes
a certain probability of E3, and so on. How could that work?
The standard solution in artificial intelligence is to expand the system’s world model
by extra variables corresponding to the sensory stimuli. A variable, in this context, is
simply a part of the world model. Let’s assume a system has variables representing
things like distance to the next tree or inclination of the floor. (Variables typically have
numbers as values.) To process sensory input, extra sensor variables are added to the
model. These new variables are causally associated with incoming stimuli so that any
relevant stimulus causes the sensor variables to take a certain value, independently of the
rest of the world model. Since there are only probabilistic connections between sensor
variables and other variables, and these probabilities can be adjusted, the same stimulus
can lead to very different values of the ordinary variables depending on the circumstances
and the system’s background beliefs.
Intuitively, the values of the sensor variables (which, again, might be numbers) represent
the stimuli with which they are associated. The system starts out with certain views
about which stimuli are likely to arrive given various configurations of the ordinary
variables. Initially, the system might assume that E1 is more likely to produce stimulus
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S than E2. But this assumption can be revised. For example, after surprisingly receiving
stimulus S when the ordinary variables were in such-and-such a configuration, the system
may be less surprised to find S again when its ordinary variables are again in that
configuration.
In principle, we wouldn’t need to add a new dimension of sensor variables if a system
already had a sufficiently rich world model. Suppose a system’s ordinary variables allow
it to make fine-grained distinctions about the electrochemical events taking place at its
computational periphery. When a given stimulus arrives, we could then design the system
to set its ordinary variables in such a way that they correctly describe the stimulus, in
electrochemical terms. However, this method would be highly inefficient (as we will see).
It also doesn’t work for simpler systems like our not-so-distant ancestors whose ordinary
variables weren’t sufficiently rich to identify all different stimuli by their physical or
functional profile.
So a more general and more efficient strategy is to use designated sensor variables
in the system’s world model. These variables represent sensory stimuli in the sense
that every suitable stimulus systematically causes the system to update its world model
by a corresponding value of its sensor variables. But this causal association between
sensor variables and electrochemical events need not be transparent to the system. If a
certain stimulus involves the release of glutamate, say, and the system is unsure about
whether glutamate is presently being released at its computational periphery, then merely
receiving the stimulus will not resolve its uncertainty. Computationally, sensor variables
are just further variables, logically independent of ordinary world variables.
From the system’s own perspective, then, receiving a sensory stimulus will seem to
make it certain of a special kind of fact that is only contingently associated with ordinary
hypotheses about the world.
3 A bag of tricks
You can see where this is going. Evolution had to find a method for updating our internal
world model in response to sensory stimuli. The method it stumbled upon, I suggest, is
the method of sensor variables. That’s why perceptual experiences appear to reveal to
us a special kind of information – information about a primitive, non-physical aspect of
the experience.
To flesh out this explanation, we need to look at another challenge our brain faces
when processing sensory input: the sheer volume of information. Consider a visual sense
organ consisting of 1000×1000 photoreceptors, each of which can distinguish 10 kinds of
electromagnetic waves. There are 10106 possible activation patterns of the photoreceptors.
It isn’t practical to discretely store for each of these patterns, perhaps encoded as a
1000× 1000 pixel matrix, how it affects any possible hypothesis about the external world.
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Some tricks are needed to make the update of a system’s world model tractable. An
obvious first move is to pre-process and compress the sensory input. The pixel matrix
could be re-encoded in terms of edges, movements, shapes, and colours, factoring out the
influence of ambient luminance or movements of the system’s own sense organs. Again,
the task is well known in cognitive science. There are attractive computational models
showing how a hierarchy of processing steps can efficiently convert raw sensory input of
different kinds into a more useful representational format involving feature spaces for
sounds, colours, orientation, and the like (perhaps influenced by attention and other
top-down processes).
Plausibly, then, the “input” to our general, amodal world model does not consist of
sensor variables tracking raw sensory activity. Rather, the amodal input is the output
of perceptual pre-processing, with different perceptual systems using different feature
spaces which help to extract useful information about the world.
The problem from the previous section now returns in a modified form: relevantly
different states of the world can cause the same end result of visual pre-processing. So
how should a prior world model be updated in response to a given pre-processing output
(a point in a feature space, say)?
The answer, I suggest, is the same as before. When a system looks at a snake in a
patch of grass, and its visual system generates a visual representation R, the system
should not become certain that it is looking at a snake, irrespective of its background
beliefs. The impact of R on the system’s world model should depend on the prior state
of the model, and even on the history of earlier experiences. So the system’s world model
should be extended by extra variables for perceptual input.
Further tricks are needed. Updating an entire world model in response to a given
input is computationally taxing. If it looks like a rock is about to hit your head, the
first priority is to duck; later you can figure out whether the object is really a rock,
where it came from, and what it reveals about the geology of your environment. So
if a certain representation R is typically caused by an environmental condition E1, it
could make sense to implement a fast and frugal process that infers salient E1 aspects
from R, checks if these call for immediate behavioural response, and then lets a slower
background process figure out whether endorsing E1 is really sensible in light of other
information available to the system, and how other aspects of the system’s world model
should be revised in response to R.
Such a fast and frugal process puts further constraints on the format of perceptual
representation (the output of perceptual pre-processing): it should be easy to read off
relevant features of the environment from a given representation. If the system’s world
model represents snakes and rocks in terms of certain variables, then it should be easy to
connect the output of visual pre-processing to these variables.
Here it may help to “import” features from perceptual representations into the system’s
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model of the environment. So far, I have assumed that a system’s world model is
neatly divided into “ordinary” variables, representing physical features of itself and its
environment, and sensor variables, representing the pre-processed sensory input. The
sensor variables provide the basis for updating the system’s model of the external world,
and that is all they do. The present suggestion is that a system could re-use the feature
space of sensor variables in its model of the external world, to represent objects in its
environment. For example, a system might represent objects in the environment as
having colour properties that are defined not in physical or functional terms, but through
their association with features in the space of visual representations. This would make it
almost trivial to infer the relevant external-world variables from the output of perceptual
pre-processing.
All these tricks, I suspect, are used in our nervous system. The success of multi-cellular
organisms largely rests on their capacity to adequately update an internal world model
in response to sensory input. Evolution won’t have missed any opportunities.
If a system works the way I described, then its world model will have an extra dimension:
an extra degree of freedom whose functional purpose is not to represent special properties
in the environment but to allow for an efficient and context-sensitive update of the rest
of the world model. In [Schwarz 2018], I called the extra dimension “imaginary” and the
others “real”, in analogy to the complex numbers, and to highlight the fact that points
in the imaginary dimension are logically independent of any genuine hypothesis about
the world as represented by the real part of the agent’s world model. When a perceptual
experience makes the system certain of some point or region in the imaginary dimension,
flexible probabilistic links determine the update of the real part of the model.
None of that requires a language. But let’s suppose some such system has developed a
language, and it has started theorizing about its own perceptual experiences. It would be
no surprise if the system were inclined to judge that there are special phenomenal facts
to which perceptual experience provides direct access and which are only contingently
related to ordinary physical and functional facts.
The system may also realize that it closely resembles certain other systems in its envi-
ronment. If its world model represents its own experiences as having special, phenomenal
properties, it would be natural to represent the experiences of other systems as also
having these properties – properties that are revealed only to the relevant system at the
relevant time. From the outside, such a thinker might conclude, we can never be sure
whether other systems experience green and red the way we do, and we can never know
what it is like to be a bat.
To be clear, a system like that is not condemned to dualism. A system’s world model
need not match its considered judgements about metaphysical reality. If a system suspects
that its world model has an extra dimension for the processing of sensory input, it may
even write an article arguing that we should resist the temptation to postulate an extra
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dimension in metaphysical reality.
4 Is consciousness an illusion?
Perceptual experiences appear to have special properties, independent of all physical facts
and directly revealed to the subject of the experience. But there are no such properties.
The appearance is an illusion – an artefact of the way our brain processes sensory input.
Does this mean that phenomenal consciousness itself is an illusion? Does it mean that
no-one ever feels pain?
Imagine a community of completely physical agents in a completely physical world,
whose cognitive system works the way I described. When these agents burn their fingers,
they update their world model by a certain “imaginary proposition” – a certain setting
of their amodal sensor variables. Over time, let’s imagine, the agents have developed
a language in which that setting of the sensor variables has become associated with a
certain sentence Q, so that when an agent burns their fingers, they become disposed to
utter and assent to Q. Some members of the community might hold that Q describes a
basic dimension of metaphysical reality, but that is not built into the meaning of Q. On
the other hand, Q also need not be equivalent to any physical or functional proposition,
at least not in a transparent way: for any physical/functional proposition P , a competent
speaker could coherently assert or entertain P ∧ ¬Q.
This is, roughly, how I think ‘I am feeling pain’ works in English. You are not committed
to dualism by uttering that sentence, but the sentence also seems to convey more than
straightforward physical or functional information.
Now suppose one of our imaginary agents, Bob, has burnt his fingers, updates his
world model by the relevant imaginary proposition, and utters Q. Is his utterance true
or false?
If pressed, I’d say it is true. Bob is in precisely the kind of state in which it is
appropriate by the rules of his language to assert Q. And if it is appropriate in a certain
context to assert Q, then it is also appropriate to assert that an utterance of Q in that
context is true.
On the other hand, you might complain that an utterance is genuinely true only if
(1) it represents the world as being a certain way, and (2) the world is that way. To
assess whether Bob’s utterance is “genuinely true”, we would therefore need to know its
representational content – how it represents the world as being.
The answer will depend on how we understand ‘representational content’. In some sense,
perhaps, Bob’s utterance of Q represents certain patterns of electrochemical activity in
his brain, due to suitable causal connections between these events and productions of Q.
On that approach, Bob’s utterance would again be true. Like Chalmers, I don’t think
brute causal conceptions of content can do much explanatory work. I prefer conceptions
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of content on which ideally rational and competent speakers can’t be ignorant of the fact
that two sentences of their language have the same content (in a given context). On such
a conception, the content of Bob’s utterance can’t be any physical proposition, since even
an ideally rational and competent Bob need not recognize P ∧ ¬Q as a contradiction.
So I’m willing to admit that there is a strict and philosophical sense in which Bob’s
utterance is not “genuinely true”, since it does not represent the physical world – which
is all the world there is – as being a certain way. But the utterance also isn’t “genuinely
false”, which would mean that (1) it represents the world as being a certain way, and (2)
the world is not that way.
The upshot is that the situation is complicated. If we accept the explanation I have
outlined, we certainly don’t have to deny that people feel pain when they burn their
fingers. We don’t have to say that consciousness is an illusion. We don’t have to revise
our practice of expressing and attributing phenomenal properties. At most, we might
have to say that in a certain strict and philosophical sense, attributions of phenomenal
properties are neither true nor false.
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